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1 Introduction
A consumer facing an uncertain income prospect will evaluate this prospect
in terms of the opportunities for using this income. These are dened by
the prices of the di¤erent commodities she cares about, and possibly other
market restrictions, like quotas. If the consumer is certain w.r.t. the terms
at which she can trade, and if these trading opportunities do not change,
then for the purpose of analyzing her attitude towards a risky income, it
su¢ ces to work with the standard single argument Bernoulli utility function
summarizing the optimal trading for any income level m.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the change in the consumers
willingness to bear income risk when her trading opportunities get restricted
because of quantity constraints. Understanding the impact of such con-
straints is useful for two reasons. On descriptive grounds, a consumer may
not always be successful in realizing her notional trades. Prices can be regu-
lated or sticky on other grounds, requiring that available supply is allocated
according to a quantity rationing mechanisman example is health care in
countries with a National Health Service. Also, many household services
are derived from durable household goods which are purchased in lumpy
amounts. Marginal adjustments of these goods are very costly, implying
that a household is committed to a service ow that may di¤er from the
ideal amount. Understanding the consequences of such trading constraints
on the willingness to bear income risks is required for correctly explaining and
interpreting the variation in empirical measures of risk aversion (cf Barski et
al. 1997).
Second, such an understanding is also useful to sharpen the normative
arguments in favour of price rigidities. For example, it has been argued
see Drèze and Gollier (1993)that downward wage rigidities can implement
second-best Pareto e¢ cient allocations when labour market contracts are in-
complete. Compared with a situation with competitive spot markets for
labour, these rigidities balance the gain in risk sharing e¢ ciency with a loss
in allocational e¢ ciency. However, these arguments are made on the as-
sumption that the employment status of a worker does not bear directly
upon her willingness to accept risks. If it does, then the normative role of
wage rigidities may need to be reexamined.
The subject of the present paper is related to a recent paper by Gollier
(2009) who considers a general dynamic choice problem and asks whether
an agent who can choose a lottery and take some action after observing
the outcome of the lottery, has a larger willingness to bear risks than an
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agent who has to commit to an action before observing the lottery outcome.
Gollier derives a set of su¢ cient conditions for the exible context to lead
to a higher risk tolerance. He then examines how rigidities may induce a
household tomore risk-prone behaviour in portfolio allocation and/or savings
decisions. While both papers address a similar question, their focus is very
di¤erent. Golliers focus is on decision taking under risk: does the ability to
postpone an action until the uncertainty is resolved always lead to more risk
taking? In the present paper, I examine the e¤ect of one particular set of
constraintsquantity constraints on purchased levels of goods and services
on the willingness to accept small income risks, and decompose it in terms
of consumer preferences.
Section 2 gives a reminder of the consumers decision problem, its prop-
erties, and the denition of her willingness to bear income risks. In section
3, I introduce quantity constraints and derive the consumers aversion w.r.t
income risks and its relation to her aversion when quantity constraints are
absent. Section 4 looks at the second ordere¤ects of quantity constraints
and shows, by means of examples, that these e¤ects may exceed the rst
order one. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 Income risk aversion without quantity con-
straints
A consumer cares about n commodities whose quantities are given by the
bundle q 2 Rn+. Let the price vector be certain and given by p 2 Rn+: The
consumers income em, however, is random with expectation m and variance
2m. Her preferences are represented by a cardinal Bernoulli utility function
u() which is monotone and strongly concave.
Suppose that the consumer is informed about the income draw before
she makes her consumption decision. Suppose as well that the income draw
coincides with the expected income m.1 Her problem is then to solve
max
q
u(q) s.t. p0q = m ():
Let the unique solution be given by the bundle q(p;m) satisfying the rst
order conditions2
uq(q(p;m)) = (p;m) p; (1)
1This is for notational convenience, since I will later evaluate the risk aversion measures
at m =Eem.
2Subscripts with u (and with  and v below) denote derivatives.
3
where (p;m) is the equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier.
The local properties of q(p;m) are well known but repeated here for future
reference:
(i) p0qm = 1; (ii)
@q
@p0
= K   qmq0; (iii) K = K 0, (2)
(iv) Kp = 0, and (v) y0Ky < 0 for y 6= p ( real scalar),
where qm stands for the vector of income e¤ects
@q
@m
. Expression (2-ii) is the
Slutsky decomposition. A similar decomposition of the price e¤ect on the
marginal utility of income, , is
@
@p
=  mq   qm: (3)
The rst rhs term is a real income e¤ect that can be neutralized by an appro-
priate change in income. The second rhs term is a substitution e¤ect: the
change in the marginal utility of income when the consumer is compensated
so as to remain at the same utility level (Silberberg, 1978, pp 260-1).
The indirect utility function is dened as v(p;m) def= u(q(p;m)) and sat-
ises vm = (p;m). By assumption, the Hessian of u(), uqq, has full rank.
Then it can be shown (see, e.g., Barten, 1977) that
K = u 1qq  

m
qmq
0
m: (4)
Using the adding-up and homogeneity conditions (2-(i) and (iv)), we get
vmm = m = q
0
muqqqm. Hence, the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion, measuring twice the risk premium the consumer is willing to pay
(per unit of variance) to get rid of the income risk, is given by
A(p;m)
def
=  vmm
vm
=  q
0
muqqqm

: (5)
Since  = q0muq, expression   q
0
muqqqm
q0muq
may be added to Hanochs (1977, The-
orem 1) list of alternative representations of relative risk aversion.
3 (Weakly binding) quantity constraints
Suppose now that q0 = (x0; z0), p0 = (p0x; p
0
z) and that the consumer can no
longer choose the sub-bundle z which is xed at z. Her problem then turns
into
max
x
u(x; z) s.t. p0xx+ p
0
zz = m (
r):
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Let the solution be given by xr(p;m; z), satisfying the rst order condition
ux = 
rpx. The indirect utility function is now vr(p;m; z)
def
= u(xr(p;m; z); z).
Repeating the procedure of section 2, the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion
for income risk is given by
A(p;mjz) def=  v
r
mm
vrm
=  x
r0
muxxx
r
m
r
: (6)
Rather than comparing xr0muxxx
r
m with q
0
muqqqm in order to relateA(p;mjz)
to A(p;m), I will use a virtual priceapproach (cf Neary and Roberts, 1980).
This consists in dening a virtual price vector z for the sub-bundle z, and
adjusting the consumers income to m+(z pz)0z such that the consumers
notional demand for that bundle coincides with the imposed quantities, yield-
ing the following identities:
z  z(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z); (7)
xr(px; pz;m; z)  x(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z); (8)
vr(px; pz;m; z)  v(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z): (9)
Implicitly di¤erentiating (7) and using the Slutsky equation (2-ii) shows
that
@z
@m
=  K 1zz zm: (10)
Intuitively, the consumer would like to respond to a marginal income increase
by dz = zmdm. However, the quantity constraint prevents her from doing
so, and therefore the virtual price of that bundle has to go up with  K 1zz dz.
The marginal utility of income is then
vrm  (v0z + vmz0)
@z
@m
+ vm = vm;
where the equality sign follows from Roys identity. Di¤erentiating one more
time w.r.t. m yields
vrmm  v0mz
@z
@m
+ vmm(1 + z
0@z
@m
)
=  vmmz0@z
@m
  vmz0m
@z
@m
+ vmm(1 + z
0@z
@m
)
= vmm   vmz0m
@z
@m
;
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where the second equality follows upon using (3). Since @z
@m
=  K 1zz zm, the
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion with quantity constraints is
 v
r
mm(p;m)
vrm(p;m)
=  vmm(px; z;m+ (z   pz)
0z)
vm(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z)   z
0
mK
 1
zz zm: (11)
Assume rst that the quantity constraints z are weak, i.e., that they
exactly coincide with z(p;m), the levels the consumer would have chosen if
her income takes the expected value. Then z = pz and the rst rhs term
reduces to  vmm(p;m)
vm(p;m)
. The following proposition immediately follows:
Proposition 1 If the quantity constraints are just binding,
A(p;mjz) = A(p;m)  z0mK 1zz zm:
Since Kzz is a negative denite matrix, so is its inverse. Therefore the
quadratic form z0mK
 1
zz zm is strictly negative (and entirely ordinal).
This result can be explained as follows. Ideally, the consumer would like
to respond to a small deviation in income, dm, from its expected value, by
increasing the demand for z commodities with dz = zmdm. Since this is not
feasible, the virtual price vector of z-goods increases with dz =  K 1zz zmdm.
This price increase has a double e¤ect on the marginal utility of income:
d =  mz0dz   z0mdz. The rst e¤ect is the change in marginal utility
because real income falls, while the second e¤ect is the compensated price
e¤ect on marginal utility. The rst e¤ect is eliminated, however, because
the consumers virtual income, m + (z   pz)0z, is by denition adjusted
with exactly zdz. Hence, the change in marginal utility due to the virtual
price change is z0mK
 1
zz zmdm, and the relative change in marginal utility is
z0mK
 1
zz zmdm.
The intuition for Proposition 1 comes about most clearly in the case where
the utility function is quasi linear in one good, e.g., in leisure. Because
preferences are quasi-linear, all exogenous income risk is then absorbed by
leisure. Since also the utility function is linear in leisure, the consumer is
risk neutral w.r.t. this income risk. But if she faces a binding quantity
constraint on her labour supply, the exogenous income risk is absorbed by
the consumption of other goods, whose marginal utility is strictly falling.
Hence, the quantity constraint turns the consumer into a strictly risk averse
person w.r.t. income risk.
Proposition 1 is a generalization of a result by Drèze and Modigliani
(1972). They considered a consumer deciding about the amount to save while
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facing an uncertain future income. They compared the attitudes towards
income risk under two settings: (i) a timeless income risk where the consumer
is informed about her income draw before making her savings decision, and
(ii) a temporal income risk where the savings decision is made before the
income draw is known. Drèze and Modigliani (1972, eq 2.9) showed that
the risk aversion for temporal income risks exceeds that for timeless income
risks by an ordinal term positively related to the (squared) income e¤ect on
current consumption and reciprocally related to the degree of substitution
between current and future consumption.
A similar relation between the coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion obtains
by using the Rotterdam parameterization for the income and substitution
e¤ects (Theil, 1976). Using a ^ above a vector to denote the diagonal
matrix with the vector as its main diagonal elements, we can write
bz
def
= bpzzm; and Szz def= 1
m
bpzKzzbpz:
Dening the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion without and
with quantity constraints asR(p;m) def= A(p;m)m andR(p;mjz) def= A(p;mjz)
m, respectively, the next result immediately follows:
Corollary 1 The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion under quantity con-
straints is given by
R(p;mjz) = R(p;m)  b0zS 1zz bz: (12)
The next result (proven in appendix) shows that these measures of risk
aversion w.r.t. income are monotone in the number of commodities subject
to a quantity constraint.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the consumption bundle q is partitioned as (x; y; z).
Then
A(p;mjy; z)  A(p;mjz):
Up til now, I have assumed that the quantity constraints are just binding,
so that z = pz. In the next section, I relax this assumption.
4 Strictly binding quantity constraints
If quantity constraints are strictly binding, then i > (<)pi depending on
whether the consumers notional demand for commodity i exceeds (falls short
7
of) the quantity constraint. The rst rhs term in (11), which may be written
as A(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z), then no longer coincides with A(p;m), and we
need to account for the inuence of z on this measure of absolute risk aversion.
For simplicity, I focus in the remainder on the case where z is a scalar. Now
(12) can be written as
R(p;mjz) = A(px; z;mv) mv  m
mv
  (b
v
z)
2
svzz
 m
mv
= R(px; z;m
v)  m
mv
  (b
v
z)
2
svzz
 m
mv
:
where the superscript v denotes evaluation at the virtual price and income
level, and mv def= m + (z   pz)z. The inuence of z on the rhs factors is
intricate. In order to proceed, I assume that the utility function is homoge-
nous of degree 1   . Then R(px; z;mv) =  and the marginal budget
share bvz coincides with the average budget share w
v
z
def
= zz
mv
. Moreover, the
compensated own price elasticity of good z, given by svzzw
v
z , can be written as
 vwvz(1 wvz), where v denotes the elasticity of substitution between good
z and the other goods (evaluated at the virtual prices and income). Then we
get:
R(p;mjz) =   m
mv
+
1
v
wvz
1  wvz
 m
mv
: (13)
Thus, there are two factors that regulate the relationship betweenR(p;mjz)
and . One is the degree of substitutability between the z-good and the other
commodities. The lower this degree, the higher is the second, ordinal, term.
The other is the relationship between nominal income m and virtual income
mv. The latter is given by m + (z   pz)z. If the consumer is forced to
consume more than her ideal demand, then z < pz and mv < m. In this
case, R(p;mjz) will exceed  both because of a low degree of substitutability
and because of forced consumption. On the other hand, if the consumer is
rationed in the sense that her notional demand exceeds z, then z > pz and
mv > m. The coe¢ cient R(p;mjz) may now fall below .
The size of the scaling factor m
mv
depends on the quantity constraint in
the following way (see appendix):
d log m
mv
d log z
? 0() z   pz
z
7   1d log z
d log pz
: (14)
The lhs is the relative increase in the willingness to pay for the z-good
when this good falls from the notional demand level to the rationed level.
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The rhs is the inverse of the uncompensated price elasticity of the z-good. If
z is a normal good, the rhs is always positive. The lhs is only positive when
the quantity constraint lies below the notional demand for the z-good. Thus,
with forced consumption, m
mv
> 1 and increasing. Forced consumption will
then always make a consumer more risk averse. With rationing, m
mv
< 1 and
possibly decreasing for su¢ ciently strong rationing. Strong rationing may
turn the consumer into a more risk tolerant person then when unconstrained.
The following two examples show the behaviour of R(p;mjz) and its two
components when preferences are given by a symmetric CES function over
two goods (see the appendix for the derivations). In both examples, m = 10
and px = pz = 1, so that the notional demand for each good is 5 units. In
the rst example, illustrated in gure 1,  = 2 and  = 2. If the quantity
constraint on z is less than 2.95 units, the consumer turns less risk averse than
without facing any constraint at all. The gure also shows that R(p;mjz)
need not be monotone in z, and here the decreasing part is due to m
mv
falling
for low levels of z.
Figure 1
The next example, shown in gure 2, is for  = 1
4
and  = 1
2
. Again, the
ideal amount of the z-good is 5 units. Now, the non-monotone behaviour of
R(p;mjz) is due to the ordinal term whose relative importance shrinks. If
the constraint is just binding, R(p;mjz = 5) = 4:5, but it drops to almost
2.5 if there is forced consumption of two additional units.
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Figure 2
These examples illustrate that even with very regularpreferences (con-
stant degree of relative risk aversion, homotheticity, a constant elasticity of
substitution), quantity constraints have complicated e¤ects, except in the
neighbourhood of the notional demand for the constrained good(s). Stated
di¤erently, (income) insurance and the z-good can be both complements, as
well as substitutes, depending on the level of the constraint.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how quantity constraints on one or more goods
or services have an e¤ect on the consumers willingness to accept income risk.
Using the virtual price approach, I have decomposed the e¤ect into an ordinal
term that depends on the own price elasticities of the constrained goods, and
a cardinal term that depends on the unconstrained degree of risk aversion.
Numerical examples show that a rationed consumer may be less risk averse
than without facing a quantity constraint, and that the relationship between
the degree of relative risk aversion, and the quantity constraint can easily
become very non-linear.
At a more general level, I believe these ndings show that employment
status of a worker/consumer, the imperfect malleability of durables, and
transaction costs more generally, all may contribute to a persons willingness
to bear risk, and not necessarily in a uniformmanner. This suggests, e.g., the
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use of a exible form for employment status when explaining the empirical
variation in risk aversion measures.
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Appendix
Proof of corollary 2.
Let ez0 = (y0; z0). Then R(p;mjez) = R(p;m)   b0ezS 1ezez bez. Then using
the rules for partitioned matrix inversion, it can be shown that b0ezS 1ezez bez =
b0zS
 1
zz b a0a where a def=  (Syy SyzS 1zz Szy) 
1
2 [by   SyzS 1zz bz]. SinceR(p;mjz) =
R(p;m)  b0zS 1zz b and a0a  0, the result follows. 
Derivation of (14)
Since mv def= m+ (z   pz)z, we have that
 d logm
v
d log z
=  z   pz
z
wvz  
d log z
d log z
wvz ? 0
m
 z   pz
z
? d log z
d log z
: (15)
Totally di¤erentiate (7) w.r.t. z to get
dz
dz
= k 1zz [1  zm(z   pz)] ;
so that
d log z
d log z
=
1  @ log z
@ logm
wvz
z pz
z
@ log z
@ log pz
jdu=0
: (16)
Using (16) in (15), and making use of the Slutsky identity then results in
(14).
The numerical example.
Solving
max
x;z
u(x; z) =
1
1   [x
 + (1  )z] 1 
s.t. pxx+ pzz = m
yields the notional demands
x(px; pz;m) =


px
 
p1 x + (1  )p1 z
 1
m;
z(px; pz;m) =

1  
pz
 
p1 x + (1  )p1 z
 1
m:
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The compensated price elasticity for good z is then
@ log z
@ log pz
jdu=0 =  (1  wz);
where the budget share wz is given by
wz =
pzz(px; pz;m)
m
= (1  )p1 z

p1 x + (1  )p1 z
 1
:
Solving z = z(px; z;m+ (z   pz)z) for z gives
z =
1  

p
1  1

x

m  pzz
z
 1

:
This gives a virtual income
mv = m+
"
1  

p
1  1

x

m  pzz
z
 1

  pz
#
z:
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